The Modern American
Volume 3
Issue 1 Spring 2007

Article 9

2007

Special Purpose Credit Programs: A WellIntentioned Idea Gone Bad
Luke Reynolds

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Reynolds, Luke. “Special Purpose Credit Programs: A Well-Intentioned Idea Gone Bad.” The Modern American, Spring 2007, 40-48.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Modern American by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Special Purpose Credit Programs: A Well-Intentioned Idea Gone Bad
Keywords

Equal Credit Opportunity Act, ECOA, Arbitrary discrimination, Special Purpose Credit Program

This article is available in The Modern American: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma/vol3/iss1/9

SPECIAL CREDIT PROGRAMS: A WELL-INTENTIONED IDEA
GONE BAD
By Luke Reynolds*
Every consumer deserves an equal
opportunity to access the credit
market, and that credit should never
be withheld because of sex or any
other factor not related to ability and
willingness to repay the loan.1

D

ecades ago, lenders could refuse to provide credit
to qualified borrowers based solely on arbitrary
characteristics such as race, religion, or sex.2
Moreover, when faced with equally creditworthy
loan applicants, lenders would charge certain borrowers higher
loan rates for no legitimate reason.3 Congress passed the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) 4 to forbid arbitrary discrimination.5 But, did the ECOA fully protect consumers from facing
discrimination on the basis of arbitrary characteristics?6
At the same time that Congress outlawed discrimination in
“any aspect” of a credit transaction on a prohibited basis, it specifically allowed “affirmative” discrimination on these same
grounds. Any such affirmative action credit program is called a
“Special Purpose Credit Program” (“SPCP”)7, known as the
consumer credit equivalent to affirmative action hiring plans.8
For instance, a disadvantaged Black applicant could legally be
turned down because of the color of her skin if she applied for
an SPCP designed for Native Americans.9 Both large and small
lenders currently offer SPCP programs that make credit available on preferential terms to certain groups.10
This article will not take a position on whether affirmative
action is constitutional or whether it is beneficial for society.
Rather, this article will argue that SPCPs are limited by equal
protection principles external to the ECOA. This question is
timely because “affirmative action” and equal protection law
have evolved in the 30 years since the ECOA and its SPCP provision was first passed. At least one law firm recently advised
its clients to be mindful of a challenge to the SPCP under civil
rights principles, in part, as a result of some of these changes.11
While the Federal Reserve Board is required to regularly review
and, if necessary, update the ECOA,12 the SPCP section has received only perfunctory changes.13 The Federal Reserve Board
is unlikely to mandate changes that negate the letter of the law
in any regulation, including the ECOA, as the Board’s role is
primarily to write regulations that implement the laws passed by
Congress.14
This article is intended to fill a necessary void and analyze
SPCPs in light of three decades of legal developments.15 Part I
will provide a brief history of applicable constitutional and civil
rights law, including the ECOA, to help the reader understand
the context for SPCPs, and introduce the reader to SPCP pro40

grams. Part II will propose a multi-step analysis and argue that
SPCPs are illegal under the equal protection clause. Part III will
propose two amendments to the ECOA to ensure that SPCPs are
available to satisfy special social needs without discriminating
against any protected class. Finally, Part IV concludes in support of fair lending enforcement to advance public policy interests.

BACKGROUND-THE EXISTING LAW
A. IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
1. EQUAL PROTECTION
The Equal Protection (“E.P.”) clause16 has evolved substantially during the twenty-first century, as it is considered to be a
“viable [and] powerful” strategy to challenge inequality.17 Simply put, the E.P. clause prohibits purposeful18 or “invidious discrimination.”19 Considering that certain classes or groups may
benefit more than others from virtually any government action,20
the courts apply one of three tests to assess the constitutionality
of a challenged behavior.21 An E.P. analysis is essentially identical under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,22 as the
primary difference is the level of government at issue.23 However, the actor need not be a state or federal entity. Private conduct is considered to be state action in several circumstances,
including conduct authorized by the state, which is significant
for this article. Unfortunately, the Court does not have a precise
test for state-authorized conduct, as it makes a determination
after weighing the facts in each case.24
2. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION LAW
An affirmative action program is designed to “change the
outward and visible signs of yesterday’s racial distinctions and
thus, to provide an impetus to the process of dismantling the
barriers, psychological or otherwise, erected by past practices.”25
The constitutionality of affirmative action programs is evaluated
under the equal protection clause because the equal protection
clause “protect[s] persons, not groups.”26 Tracing their origins
to New Deal-era labor laws,27 affirmative action programs
started in the employment context and later expanded to college
admissions.28 Affirmative action is largely court-defined, as it is
not expressly authorized in what is considered its statutory genesis, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.29 One source of controversy is
whether the Supreme Court abrogated this “unambiguously colorblind” statute through its decisions to allow affirmative action
programs,30 or whether its legislative history allows consideration of race “in order to alleviate the historic problem of racial
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inequity.”31
Affirmative action law has undergone substantial change in
the forty years since its inception. Most affirmative action cases
are traceable to Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
which allowed a public university to consider race as a factor in
its admissions process.32 The Court recently upheld the fundamental holding of Bakke, holding that it was legal to consider
race as one of many factors,33 yet illegal to automatically favor
an applicant based on race.34 Nonetheless, the Court will use
strict scrutiny to determine whether governmental race-based
affirmative action programs are narrowly tailored to the compelling government interest.35
The preceding discussion applies only to affirmative action
plans by governmental entities. The Supreme Court has noted
that affirmative action programs by private actors do not trigger
equal protection clause scrutiny.36 Thus, the affirmative action
principles delineated above will apply only to SPCPs that are
operated, either directly or indirectly, by the government. Truly
private SPCPs need not satisfy these rules. This section summarized the underlying law pertaining to the affirmative action-like
component of SPCPs which permit otherwise illegal discrimination. The next section introduces these anti-discrimination laws.

B. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW IN LENDING
While the Civil Rights Act (“CRA”) of 1968 generally prohibited discrimination by private actors in housing-related transactions,37 it neither “proscribed” lending discrimination, nor
established a comprehensive enforcement scheme.38 Thus, the
CRA was inadequate to protect creditworthy individuals against
credit discrimination on “often irrational” grounds.39
The ECOA was passed in 1974 to protect consumers on the
basis of sex and marital status in response to reports of credit
practices that ran contrary to the spirit of equality for all.40 For
instance, the ECOA was initially called a “Women’s Law” 41
because creditworthy females often had been unable to obtain
credit in their own names.42 Congress enhanced and expanded
the ECOA two years later in 1976.43 The ECOA prohibits a
lender from discriminating in “any aspect” of a credit transaction on the basis of sex, marital status, race, color, religion, national origin, age, receipt of public assistance income, or exercising certain consumer rights in good faith.44 The ECOA protects a consumer in all stages of the credit process from the
lender’s conduct before it receives an application, the decision
whether to approve the application and on what terms, to the
treatment of the consumer once becoming a customer.45
1. OVERVIEW OF SPCPS
The SPCP was added to the ECOA in 1976. The three
types of SPCPs include: those authorized by law for the benefit
of an economically disadvantaged class;46 those offered by a
non-profit corporation for its members or an economically disadvantaged class;47 and those offered by a for-profit organization to meet special needs.48 To qualify, the targeted group need
not prove historical disadvantage or disparate treatment.49
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Credit unions, as not-for-profit institutions,50 fall into the
second category. Thus, while banks and for-profit lenders must
satisfy legal formalities before establishing an SPCP, a credit
union can create an SPCP without a formal plan for any group
or for any reason.51 Credit unions requested and received this
special treatment compared to other lenders because they feared
violating the ECOA by restricting lending to their members.52
Simply put, Congress wanted to permit “church-affiliated credit
unions” to only serve their members.53 Thus, Congress sought
to protect credit unions using the SPCP provision.
SPCPs are intended to help economically disadvantaged
individuals or meet special social needs. It is possible that the
SPCP provision was partially motivated by a federal commission report54 that recommended low-income individuals receive
credit on competitive terms, and presented case studies on programs that help the disadvantaged. Regardless, Congress had in
mind programs based on the applicant’s age when creating the
SPCP for for-profit organizations,55 as Congress did not intend
to prohibit positive credit programs aimed at “young adults.”56
SPCPs are clearly not limited to certain age groups, as the three
examples provided in Regulation B for SPCP programs targeted
to a specific audience are “race, national origin, or sex.”57
The SPCP allows creditors to engage in conduct that would
otherwise be discriminatory.58 A lender may require all participants in a SPCP to share a “common characteristic,” such as
age, while barring from the program those who do not meet this
characteristic.59 A creditor does not have free reign, though. As
a lender, the creditor is still subject to all other provisions of the
ECOA and cannot discriminate other than by requiring this common characteristic. SPCPs also cannot be structured to evade
the requirements of the ECOA. It is unlikely that a SPCP can be
used for any residential real estate-related loan program because
the Fair Housing Act does not include a SPCP exception.60
2. SPCPS IN PRACTICE
Just as Congress intended,61 a SPCP may overtly discriminate against specific protected classes or disparately treat62 certain groups. The Federal Reserve Board63 acknowledged this
when it found that a New York State law that prevented a SPCP
from being established on the basis of “race, creed, color, national origin, sex, or marital status” was preempted by the
ECOA.64 The Federal Reserve Board evidently realized that
Congress intended to allow SPCPs to discriminate. Furthermore, while not dispositive of the issue, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has stated in court filings that a
SPCP may be based on race, assuming the program meets all the
other legal requirements.65
The Federal Reserve Board proposed to clarify the regulation to indicate that a SPCP “should not have the effect of depriving people who are not part of the class of rights or opportunities they otherwise would have.”66 Regardless, federal bank
examiners are instructed to encourage banks offering SPCPs
based on a protected class to rename and restructure the program
based on factors “not prohibited by the ECOA,” such as “first41

time home buyer.”67
Indeed, the SPCP is used in a discriminatory manner. For
instance, the Virginia Housing Development Authority
(“VHDA”) precluded unmarried couples from participating in a
preferential loan program by requiring that the applicants be
related by “blood or marriage.”68 A federal court dismissed an
ECOA claim for marital status discrimination on which the
plaintiff would “plainly prevail”69 because the VHDA program
was a SPCP authorized by state law. Additionally, Mobil Oil
and the former OmniBank offered a SPCP that allowed female
or minority borrowers preferential treatment in the lending process when seeking a loan.70 Credit unions offer preferential
credit programs targeted to an age group under 62.71 While it is
unknown how many SPCP programs are in existence, the federal Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”)72 issued a guidance
letter to the lenders it regulates in response to SPCP inquiries
from thrifts.73

THE SPECIAL PURPOSE EXCEPTION IS LIMITED IN
SCOPE
A. BASIC OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS
SPCP programs face limitations not inherent in the ECOA.
SPCPs may violate equal protection concepts or exceed the
scope of the ECOA law. Based on an equal protection analysis,
I offer here a multi-step test to gauge their legality.74
The first step is to determine whether the SPCP discriminates against a protected class. The eligibility requirements for
a SPCP may be based on either neutral factors or on the applicant’s membership in a protected class. An example of the former is a program that offers any first-time, low-income homebuyer with a credit on closing costs. An example of the latter is
a program that offers any person under 25 years of age with a
preferred rate on an installment loan. Both program structures
are now legal under the ECOA. However, it is clear that only
programs in the first category should be presumed legal. The
analysis for the first category of programs will end for purposes
of this article, although these programs would be illegal if they
violate the disparate treatment rules of the ECOA.75 By contrast, programs in the second category should be suspect owing
to their use of a prohibited class, and hence proceed to the next
step of the analysis.
The next step of analysis is to identify the type of discrimination.76 Discrimination can occur during either the underwriting process (when the lender decides whether to approve the
loan request), or after approval when the terms and conditions
(such as rates) are set. For instance, a program that enables
those under age 25 to receive a credit card regardless of their
credit history is an example of a lender discriminating during the
underwriting process, while a program offering a loan rate discount only to women would be an example of discrimination
through terms and conditions.
From there, the analysis splits depending on the type of
discrimination involved. Any program that offers terms and
conditions that are preferential compared to ordinary borrowers
42

is illegal, as SPCPs are not empowered to discriminate in this
matter.77 For any program that discriminates in the underwriting
process, the analysis hinges on whether the SPCP is operated by
a public or private entity. If the SPCP is purely private, the
lender discrimination is authorized because the program falls
under the SPCP exception to the normal anti-discrimination
rules of ECOA. Equal protection principles would not regulate
the private actor’s conduct. If the SPCP is public or governmental, the proper level of scrutiny to evaluate the SPCP is determined based on the protected class at issue. This article argues
that all SPCPs, even those offered by private lenders, must be
analyzed in this way.
The 5th Amendment and 14th Amendment generally provide
no protection against discrimination committed by private actors.78 Thus, an equal protection claim against a private entity
for a discriminatory program will fail if the lender is not (either
directly or indirectly) a state actor.79
However, the Constitution prohibits discrimination by a
private entity when there is a “sufficiently close nexus” between
the government and the lender’s questionable practice.80 The
government must provide sufficient encouragement, “either
overt or covert,” to make it responsible for the practice.81 In the
words of Judge Friendly, “the state must be involved not simply
with some activity...alleged to have inflicted injury upon a plaintiff but with the activity that caused the injury...the state action,
not the private action, must be the subject of complaint.”82 For
example, governmental authorization does not exist when a statute governs deregulated, traditional business conduct,83 yet does
when the law creates a climate in which private parties may
choose to discriminate.84
SPCPs easily fit the second category as the SPCP creates an
exception that permits discrimination that would otherwise be
illegal; it is essentially a “statutory invitation to private actors to
discriminate.”85 In other words, lenders would be unable to
practice illegal discrimination but for the government’s SPCP
exception. This is clearly an invitation to discriminate; the government is the root cause of the private actor’s discrimination.
One commentator has noted that the Supreme Court will find
invitations to discrimination to be state action, as enticing discrimination is different from allowing the free market to independently develop.86 Consequently, all SPCPs must be analyzed
as state-administered programs.

B. WHY STATE ADMINISTERED SPCPS FAIL EQUAL
PROTECTION ANALYSIS
This section will analyze SPCPs that are expressly state
authorized or considered state actions.87 In reality, though, this
discussion applies to all SPCP programs since, as shown earlier,
all SPCP programs are government authorized. To recap, the
alleged state interest in allowing governmental entities and nonprofits to create SPCPs is to help an “economically disadvantaged class of persons,” for credit unions to serve their members,
and allow private entities to meet “special social needs.”88
A court performs the Equal Protection Clause analysis using
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the appropriate level of scrutiny. The court will use an intermediate scrutiny test for sex, strict scrutiny for race, color, religion,
and national origin, and rational basis scrutiny for marital status,
age, receipt of public assistance income, or exercising certain
consumer rights in good faith.
1. ANALYSIS UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY: RACE, COLOR, RELIGION & NATIONAL ORIGIN
Affirmative action programs based on race or national origin must use a strict scrutiny, or narrowly tailored, least discriminatory89 means to meet a compelling state interest.90 Any
SPCP based on classifications that are subject to strict scrutiny
(race, color, religion, and national origin) fails this test.
The Supreme Court has held that any person has “the right
to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny,” and that
“benign” discrimination cannot be held to a lower standard of
scrutiny.91 The Court later went a step further, and struck down
a university admissions program that automatically favored applicants on the basis of race.92 The Court applies strict scrutiny
to suspect programs based on color, religion, or national origin.
Regarding SPCPs, the Fifth Circuit found an analogous
federal program unconstitutional. In Moore v. USDA, the plaintiff was denied financing from a USDA program designed to
help “socially disadvantaged groups” due to his race, as the notification letter stated, in part, “No Whites.”93 Although his Fifth
Amendment equal protection claim failed for seeking monetary
damages and not equitable relief, the plaintiff succeeded in his
ECOA claim.94
A SPCP is not the least discriminatory means to accomplish
Congress’s stated goal or to serve its intended purpose. For instance, consider the situation of an immigrant from an impoverished Eastern European nation who owns a small business in an
impoverished community, yet would be precluded, simply because of skin color, from participating in a major bank’s SPCP
offering preferential underwriting standards.95 The stated goal
of helping the economically disadvantaged is clearly not served
when a business is unable to receive special financing terms
because of the owner’s race or national origin. Consequently,
any SPCP that is structured based on a particular class of individuals benefits solely that class and excludes similarly situated
individuals in other classes.
Likewise, it would clearly be more effective to offer credit
under a streamlined program to any individual without a credit
history, rather than only to those who share an arbitrary or immutable characteristic (such as age). In other words, a program
structured around neutral factors, such as economic need, would
be the most beneficial to society and most effectively fulfill
Congress’ stated goals.96 Perhaps this is why President Clinton
shifted the focus of affirmative action policy solely from membership in a protected class to residence in an economically distressed area as defined by poverty and unemployment data.97
Consequently, the least burdensome means test is not satisfied
by SPCPs.
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Additionally, Congress could have clarified that a credit
union may only lend to its members without creating a much
broader exception that favors credit unions over banks with respect to the ECOA.98 Therefore, these SPCPs are not narrowly
tailored (nor the least discriminatory means) to meet Congress’
goals of helping economically disadvantaged individuals, protecting credit unions, or meeting special social needs.99 Disadvantaged individuals and credit union members will receive the
same credit opportunities when a SPCP is structured on a neutral
basis.
2. ANALYSIS UNDER INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY: GENDER
Gender discrimination is evaluated using intermediate scrutiny, although recent cases indicate that it is an elevated level of
intermediate scrutiny review.100 A program that discriminates
on the basis of gender violates the equal protection clause,
unless it serves an important governmental interest101 and has an
exceedingly persuasive justification.102 For instance, it was illegal to grant alimony in a divorce to the wife only, as the Court
held that it was not appropriate to use gender as a proxy for need
or assume the male was the primary breadwinner.103 Interestingly, gender-based affirmative action programs are less likely
to be invalidated than race-based programs.104
Nonetheless, the outcome of SPCPs using intermediate
scrutiny is the same as with strict scrutiny earlier. Specifically,
courts will review the stated purpose of any affirmative action
program to ensure its legality.105 As one court stated, “when
government undertakes affirmative action, it must present a
‘strong basis in evidence’ for doing so.”106
Here, Congress failed to adequately support its decision to
implement this affirmative action program to discriminate based
on a protected class. The House hearings do not discuss the
SPCP provision, except for testimony by an industry representative who sought an exemption from the ECOA for “negative
discrimination that results in the denial of credit” or “reverse
discrimination” programs.107 The House hearings included testimony on “affirmative approaches” by lenders, which were targeted to underserved, inner-city areas as much as they were designed to help “minority businessmen.”108 The Senate hearings,
interestingly, refer to the House hearings as being the justification for the SPCP exception.109 Therefore, SPCPs based on gender must fail because Congress failed to provide the requisite
strong justification.
3. ANALYSIS UNDER RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY: MARITAL
STATUS, AGE, RECEIPT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE INCOME, OR
GOOD FAITH EXERCISE OF CERTAIN CONSUMER RIGHTS
It is possible some SPCPs could be based on a protected
category within the ECOA, yet be subject only to rational basis
constitutional scrutiny.110 For example, a program could offer a
credit card to customers between ages 18 and 25 without regard
for the applicant’s length of credit experience. This program is
discriminatory against older borrowers who do not have credit
histories, as these older borrowers are, at a minimum, not encouraged to apply, and would be subject to the normal under43

writing criteria that would preclude them from obtaining credit.
It is likely that a SPCP based on any category reviewed
using rational basis scrutiny would satisfy an equal protection
analysis. Under rational basis scrutiny, a law is upheld assuming its means are, at least remotely, related to a health, safety, or
moral concern of government, even if there is a less discriminatory policy available.111 Additionally, courts will give particular
deference to the legislature on social and economic legislation.112 In short, courts give broad deference to the government
when conducting a review using the rational basis standard.113
Thus, a SPCP structured on any of these criteria would meet
constitutional scrutiny.

A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Since SPCPs are presumably illegal under equal protection
analysis in light of the information presented above, the ECOA
must be amended. This is because a SPCP should never be
based on a protected class, and credit unions should be held to
the same standards as banks under the ECOA. Two amendments are proposed below.
First, the ECOA should be amended to prevent membership
in a protected class from being a prerequisite for participation in
a SPCP. This may be accomplished by adding a provision to §
1691(c) that states, “A credit assistance or special purpose credit
program may not base its eligibility guidelines upon whether a
person is a member of a class of persons defined in § 1691(a).”
This amendment would preserve Congress’s intent to enhance
the credit opportunities available to the disadvantaged, yet
would protect a person from discrimination based on immutable
characteristics such as race or sex. The change would also ensure that SPCPs are subject to relaxed judicial scrutiny.114
For instance, a hypothetical SPCP designed to help those
without established credit histories should not be limited to only
those under age 25, as older individuals may not have credit
histories due to legitimate reasons such as being a recent immigrant to the United States or heritage from a culture that shuns
traditional financial service providers. A hypothetical program
based on class helps borrowers solely of a specific class who
have a credit problem, and not those in other classes with the
same credit problem. If the fair lending laws are relevant, a
lender should not be given the flexibility to discriminate when a
viable alternative is available to prevent discrimination.
Second, credit union issues require another amendment to
the ECOA. As described earlier, credit unions are broadly
granted more flexibility than banks to use SPCPs to discriminate. However, this is not the only way that credit unions receive favorable treatment under the ECOA. The National Credit
Union Administration (“NCUA”) enforces federal credit unions’
compliance with the ECOA.115 The NCUA must refer to the
DOJ all patterns or practices of ECOA violations that involve
either illegal discrimination in “any aspect”116 of a credit transaction or the improper discouragement or denial of applications.117 The DOJ provides Congress with an annual report
44

summarizing the ECOA referrals it receives from the federal
regulatory agencies.118 These reports indicate that the NCUA
has made no referrals to DOJ, while the four bank regulatory
agencies have referred dozens of substantive ECOA violations
to DOJ. For instance, a General Accounting Office Report
showed that the NCUA made none of the 53 referrals between
1990 and 1995,119 and none of the 140 cases sent to DOJ between 1999-2004.120
On the one hand, the fact that the NCUA referred no ECOA
matters to DOJ could be an excellent sign because it suggests
that credit unions are in compliance with the fair lending laws.
Granted, credit unions are often smaller and less complex than
many banks, thereby indicating less fair lending risk.121 A former NCUA administrator even testified before Congress that
credit unions are “different” from other lenders because they “do
not deal with the general public” but rather those affiliated
through a common bond.122 Alternatively, it could indicate either that the NCUA is not making referrals to DOJ when required, or the Interagency Fair Lending Procedures are not being
properly implemented during examinations of federal credit unions.
Unfortunately, based on the author’s review of credit union
websites in April of 2005, it appears that the second scenario
may be true.123 Congress intended the mandatory referral provision of the ECOA to be an “enforcement mechanism” when
adding it to the ECOA in 1991.124 Credit unions already receive
preferred treatment compared to banks in other areas.125 Congress did not intend for the NCUA to put a low priority on the
ECOA.126 This is particularly important as credit unions are
becoming more analogous to banks by getting larger, more complex, and merging together.
Therefore, §1691 (c)(2) should be amended to clarify that
credit unions can lend to their members without violating the
ECOA, but may not otherwise receive less scrutiny than banks
when establishing a SPCP. The change can be accomplished by
revising §202.8(a)(2) to read, “It is not a violation of this section
for a nonprofit organization to extend credit only to its members.
A nonprofit organization may also create a special purpose program to meet special social needs pursuant to the standards prescribed in regulations by the Board.”
It is essential that the extra discretion given to credit unionrun SPCPs be eliminated and their rules mirror those for private
lenders. As mentioned earlier, Congress intended this provision
simply to protect credit unions from ECOA challenges. Amending this provision will allow Congress to clarify that credit unions may not use a credit assistance program to discriminate
without first meeting the same requirements as a bank. After all,
it does not matter to a consumer whether she is discriminated
against by a SPCP operated by a bank or a credit assistance program operated by a credit union. These proposed changes to the
ECOA will ensure that every creditworthy consumer has equal
access to credit regardless of immutable or arbitrary characterisTHE MODERN AMERICAN

tics such as race or national origin that fall under equal protec- sumer protection issue that affects solely one institution’s memtion analysis.
bers. Rather, fair lending enforcement is necessary to further
the national public policy goal of ensuring equal access to credit
CONCLUSION
by creditworthy borrowers. This article has shown that the
It is important that we do not forget that illegal discrimina- SPCP provision of the ECOA has not been updated to reflect the
tion still occurs in housing and finance despite the substantial changes in equal protection law over the past three decades. By
achievements achieved over recent years.127 Enforcing fair enacting the proposals propounded in this article, Congress can
lending laws is not just a safety-and-soundness issue or a con- ensure that all have equal access to credit.
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